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Delivering Electoral Integrity Under Pressure:  
Local Government, Electoral Administration and the 2016 Brexit Referendum 
 
Abstract 
The management and delivery of elections is a core task for local government officials in 
many countries, but often overlooked by research and policy makers. This article charts 
the nature and consequences of emerging pressures on local government officials to 
deliver high profile electoral events in an established democracy. Through a rigorous and 
comprehensive survey of local electoral administrators and in-depth interviews, it 
examines how electoral administration functioned in the 2016 UK Brexit referendum. In 
so doing, it provides broader lessons about the dynamics of electoral integrity at the local 
level.  Problems with insufficient funds, growing distrust of public officials and late 
legislation were particularly problematic.  Inappropriate campaigner behaviour was 
concentrated amongst Leave campaigners, reflecting new challenges for electoral 
integrity as populist movements arise.  Problems were less frequent in Scotland, 
suggesting that different organisational factors are important.  The effects of funding 
deficiencies suggest that austerity agendas can affect electoral integrity. 
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The management and delivery of elections is a core task for local government officials in many 
countries. While this is often a forgotten ‘Cinderella’ service, the performance of local government in 
delivering elections is fundamental to the provision of representative democracy more generally.  
Despite recent advances in the area (Birch, 2011; James, 2020; James et. al. 2019; Norris 2013), the 
pressures that local electoral officials face and the drivers of electoral management quality remains 
relatively unexplored.  
This article puts the pressures faced by this largely forgotten local government function centre stage. 
Through an original, rigorous and comprehensive survey of local electoral administrators, backed by 
in-depth interviews, it examines how local electoral administration performed in one of the highest-
profile and pressurised electoral events in an advanced democracy in recent years, the 2016 Brexit 
referendum on whether the UK should leave or remain in the European Union.  This was a significant 
electoral event that would have a major impact on the governance of Britain, its position within the 
world, the future of the European Union and was heralded as part of a dramatic turn towards populism 
across the West.  International interest meant that Britain’s electoral machinery was under intense 
scrutiny at a time when concerns had been raised about the functioning of electoral processes in many 
democracies.  
The first part of the article introduces concerns that have been raised about electoral administration 
and integrity in recent years.  The second section outlines the political context surrounding the 
referendum and the electoral machinery, while also describing the managerial structures that were in 
place.  Some expectations about the underlying patterns and dynamics of problems that local 
administrators might have been expected to deal with at the referendum are identified by drawing 
from the broader comparative literature on electoral integrity.  The third part briefly describes the 
data and methodology.  The fourth part provides an analysis of the data, before the final section 
discusses the implications.  It therefore makes an important empirical contribution to the literature 
on local government and its role in delivering electoral administration and integrity in established 
democracies in general. It also adds an important insight into the growing literature on the Brexit 
referendum, its conduct and wider debates about populism. 
 
Electoral Administration, Management and Integrity 
 
Electoral administration and management are key parts of the electoral cycle for researchers to 
examine in established democracies.  Electoral administration refers to the administrative systems 
through which electoral registers are compiled, votes are cast and counted.  Electoral management 
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refers to the ‘organisations, networks, resources and instruments involved in implementing elections’ 
(James, 2020: 5). These are crucial elements of electoral integrity.  
The composition of the network that implements elections varies around the world (James et al., 
2019).  Local government has a central part to play in delivering electoral administration in many 
states, however. In some countries, such as the UK and USA, electoral administration is decentralised 
to local government. Even in countries where central government has overall responsibility, local 
government personnel and facilities have a considerable role in their on the ground delivery. Local 
government electoral administrators are therefore the ‘street-level bureaucrats’ of the electoral 
process (Lipsky, 1980), deploying local knowledge to help provide a fundamental democratic service.  
The UK is an excellent case study for examining the performance of local electoral management. 
Electoral management is decentralised across just under 400 local authorities. Under the direction of 
individually appointed returning officers (ROs), these local administrators deliver and implement 
elections across the UK. While an Electoral Commission has oversight of the conduct of elections, it is 
something of a hybrid in standard models of electoral management which identify electoral 
management body (‘EMB’) independence as international best practice. Although the Electoral 
Commission acts independently of any government department, it is directly accountable to 
parliament and dependent upon parliament to set the bounds of its powers and the terms of electoral 
law more generally. The Electoral Commission has no powers of direction to local ROs in normal 
electoral circumstances, although, as discussed below, this changes during referendums. Funding for 
some contests is provided by national government, while local authorities fund local elections and 
electoral registration from their own budgets (James and Jervier, 2017; Clark, 2019).1 Despite this 
complexity, the decentralised nature of UK elections means that there is potentially substantial local 
variation in performance and experience from which broader lessons about electoral administration 
and integrity can be learned.                     
A variety of frameworks have been established to evaluate the quality of electoral administration and 
management (Norris, 2013, Elklit and Reynolds 2005).  Electoral Management Bodies are not unlike 
schools and hospitals in that they provide public services to citizens. James (2020) introduced the 
PROSeS framework for evalauting EMB performance, building from frameworks used to evaluate 
other public services.  This focusses attention the design of electoral processes, availability and use of 
resources, service output quality, service outcomes and levels of satisfaction.  This expanded upon 
concerns raised by Birch (2011: 26) and Norris (2014: 36) that there were other ways in which electoral 
malpractice might occur other than deliberate deliberate partisan efforts to alter the result.2   
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Research has identified several factors that can undermine electoral management and administration 
quality.  One factor that affects the delivery of elections is funding. Clark (2014, 2017b, 2019) 
demonstrates that increased funding can positively affect the quality of electoral administration. 
James (2020) reveals that the introduction of individual electoral registration in the UK led to a 
significant increase in costs for electoral administrators.  James and Jervier (2017) show that electoral 
administrators in England and Wales increasingly became over budget between 2010-11 and 2015-16 
and that this affected whether voter engagement strategies were developed. We would therefore 
expect variation in the extent to which electoral administrators had sufficient resources for the 
referendum and that this might have had an effect on their capacity to deliver the poll.   
A further threat that is commonly raised is that trust-based systems for polling and registration are 
open to electoral fraud. It has been argued that ballot box stuffing and personation in the polling 
station might occur if procedures are too lax (Ahlquist et al. 2014; Christensen and Schultz 2014; 
Schedler, 2002).  Problems in Britain, such as nineteenth century cases of treating and bribery, were 
widely thought to have been fixed by measures ensuring ballot secrecy (James, 2012).  Concerns have 
re-emerged in the twenty-first century following high-profile cases of electoral fraud (Mawrey 2005, 
2015). Hill et al. (2017) argued that ethnic-kinship networks in Pakistani and Bangladeshi-origin 
communities in England had a ‘range of vulnerabilities, which may make them susceptible to becoming 
victims of electoral fraud’. Although very few allegations result in successful prosecution, there were 
on average just under three hundred allegations of electoral fraud recorded annually by police forces 
between 2010-2017 (Electoral Commission, 2017).  Some have advocated increased security 
provisions, such as voter identification requirements, or restricting postal and proxy voting provisions 
(Wilks-Heeg 2008; Electoral Commission 2014; Hill et al. 2017).  In a report commissioned by the 
Conservative government, former local government secretary Sir Eric Pickles recommended 
introducing voter identification to combat perceived electoral fraud (Pickles 2016). This was piloted in 
English council elections in 2018 and 2019.3     
Another broad threat that is commonly raised is that overly bureaucratic procedures can be used for 
voting and registration which can discourage participation.  The classic rational choice institutionalist 
claim is that when the logistical costs of voting are lower, voter participation will be higher 
(Rosenstone and Wolfinger, 1980).  Meanwhile,  Schaffer (2008) has warned that there can be ‘hidden 
costs’ to electoral reforms. Researchers therefore often prescribe more convenient voting procedures 
to maximise participation.  These might include postal voting, election-day registration, public holidays 
on election day or remote electronic voting.  Restrictive procedures such as voter identification or 
early registration deadlines should be discouraged because they will lead to a reduction in democratic 
participation (James 2012; Garnett 2019).  According to Birch (2011: 36) ‘maladministration … of 
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electoral registration appears to be one of the most common forms of electoral abuse in many 
jurisdictions’.  
There were reasons to expect problems with inconvienient polling and registration procedures at the 
referendum.  A study of the 2015 general election found that two-thirds of polling stations turned 
away at least some would-be but unregistered voters (Clark and James 2017).  There is no system of 
automatic electoral registration in the UK.  This system of individual electoral registration (IER), which 
was introduced from 2014 and ended the transition in December 2015, required citizens to provide 
their national insurance number and other personal identifiers.  Concerns were raised about whether 
this would negatively affect voter registration rates and participation, especially amongst young 
people (James, 2014b).  The EU Referendum was the first major nationwide electoral event in which 
this system was used.  The referendum therefore provided an opportunity to explore whether these 
antipcated problems had been averted. 
A final potential challenge is that posed by populist movements to electoral integrity. Anti-elite 
populist movements show strong distrust towards the state apparatus, including electoral officials.  
They are also thought to reject norms of electoral integrity (e.g. Norris and Inglehart 2018). An 
extensive literature has focused on their emergence (e.g. Mudde, 2007).  There is, however, little 
research on how populist campaigning interacts with electoral integrity and administration.  Evidence 
from a comparable event, the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, suggests that administrators 
would be put under considerable pressure by often inexperienced campaigners mobilised by such a 
high-profile referendum (Birch and El Safoury, 2017; Clark, 2014b).  Since the Brexit referendum has 
been claimed to be an archetypal case of an anti-elite populist movement (Freeden, 2017; Lakhnis et 
al, 2018), it provides a unique opportunity to establish whether this added additional pressures to 
administering the referendum. 
 
The EU Referendum 
 
The 2016 referendum on whether the UK should remain or leave the European Union was a significant 
event that would have a major impact on the governance of Britain, its place in the world and the 
future of the EU. It was heralded as part of a turn towards populism across advanced democracies.  It 
gathered coverage internationally ensuring that Britain’s electoral machinery was under intense 
scrutiny.  Against most expectations, Britain voted to leave the EU by 51.9 to 48.1 per cent.   
Concerns were raised about the integrity of the UK’s electoral machinery during the referendum. Two 
days before polling day, one YouGov poll reported that 28% of people thought it was ‘probably true’ 
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that the referendum would be rigged – rising to 46% amongst those intending to vote to leave the EU 
(Demianyk, 2016).4  A social media campaign, reportedly by the Leave campaign, encouraged voters 
to take pens to polling stations to mark their ballot papers so that election officials could not change 
their vote afterwards (Fitzgerald 2016).   Warnings were made that ‘millions could miss out’ because 
their name was not on the electoral register (BBC News 2016). The government’s voter registration 
website crashed on the deadline for applications (BBC News, 2017).  UKIP leader Nigel Farage, minutes 
after polls closed, seemed to concede defeat and imply that integrity of the result could be 
questionable after the decision to extend the registration deadline (Pegg and Walker, 2018).  The 
referendum came in a tense political climate, coming shortly after the murder of Labour MP Jo Cox by 
a far-right terrorist. 
The UK has a different legal and management framework for the conduct of referendums to that of 
normal elections. The Electoral Commission’s role is enhanced, becoming responsible for both 
regulating and delivering referendum processes. The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 
(PPERA) 2000 specifies that the Electoral Commission Chair, or someone they appoint, must act as the 
Chief Counting Officer (‘CCO’) responsible for certifying the outcome of the referendum.  The CCO is 
also responsible for appointing Regional Counting Officers (‘RCOs’) for each electoral region, a level of 
administration not found in normal electoral circumstances. These 11 RCOs were responsible for ‘co-
ordinating the planning and administration across their electoral region and for aggregating the local 
totals into a total for the electoral region’.5  Departing from normal electoral practice, the CCO could 
also issue directions to all 382 Counting Officers (COs) responsible for the voting process in their local 
area.6  In mainland Britain, the CO was the Returning Officer for the local authority.7  The referendum 
was otherwise run in accordance with Britain’s electoral laws under the electoral register used for 
parliamentary elections, which is maintained by electoral registration officers in local authorities. This 
management structure had only been used once before during the 2011 Alternative Vote referendum. 
This led to cost inefficiencies in that referendum and overlooked the local knowledge of electoral 
officials (James 2017).  This meant that the EU referendum would also be an important test of how 
electoral management structures worked in practice. 
Research Questions and Expectations 
This article seeks to address the following questions: 
- What were the nature and extent of the problems experienced by local electoral 
administrators in the management of the EU Brexit Referendum? 
- What were the drivers of these problems? 
- What lessons are there for the delivery of electoral integrity in established democracies? 
7 
 
Based on the challenges above, several areas problems with electoral management are examined: 
problems with the management structure and legislative framework, funding deficiencies, electoral 
fraud, and bureaucratic hurdles to participation.  Bivariate and multivariate quantitative analysis, 
alongside qualitative analysis, will then be undertaken to assess four sets of expectations about the 
dynamics of electoral integrity at the referendum, each of which will be considered separately. 
1. Problems with electoral fraud and intimidation were concentrated in communities with 
either/and/or a) higher levels of immigration b) higher proportion of Bangladeshi and 
Pakistani communities c) shaped by patterns in the leave/remain vote. 
Research has already discussed claims that electoral fraud is more prevalent in Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi communities (Electoral Commission, 2014; Hill et al. 2017) so this should be considered.  
However, there was no obviously organised group campaigning at the referendum on behalf of 
Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities – although migrants in general stood to be profoundly 
affected by the outcome.   Instead, the referendum was contested by between Leavers and Remainers.  
An analysis of patterns of voter fraud by voting intentions may therefore reveal important patterns in 
concerns about these problems. 
 
2. Electoral registration problems were concentrated in areas that were either/and/or a) urban 
and b) had higher student populations 
Existing research has suggested that under-registration is more likely to be a problem in urban areas 
and with student populations (James, 2020). 
3. Insufficient funding led to lower quality management of the poll. 
As noted above, electoral management problems are commonly connected to problems with the 
funding for the poll.   We might expect areas with relatively low levels of resource, proportionate to 
need in the view of electoral officials, being correlated with various problems within the functioning 
of the poll. 
4. Funding was more of a problem in a) Conservative areas and b) urban areas 
The Conservative Party has usually been committed to budget deficit reduction, while the Labour Party 
has usually stressed a commitment to maintain public service provision.  A common claim from the 
US and cross-national studies is that parties and politicians of the right perceive themselves to benefit 
from lower voter turnout, while parties of the left might perceive themselves to gain from higher 
participation (Clark, 2017b; Hasen 2012; James 2012).  Conservative controlled councils may therefore 
be expected to spend less on electoral registration for both ideological and partisan reasons, leaving 
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greater strain on officials in these areas. At the same time, funding pressures might be shaped by 
demographic factors.  Urban areas have a more transient population which could make updating the 
register more challenging – and therefore be more resource intensive.   
Methodology  
Surveys of electoral officials have now become established as a method for assessing electoral 
integrity (Burden et al., 2012; Clark and James 2017; Clark, 2017b; James 2014a, 2017, 2019, 2020; 
Moynihan and Silva, 2008).  An electronic survey was sent to the 380 counting officers (COs) in local 
authorities administering the referendum throughout Great Britain. It was also sent to electoral 
authorities in Gibraltar and to the Electoral Office of Northern Ireland (EONI). Electoral administrators’ 
expert knowledge as ‘street-level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky, 1980) makes them uniquely placed to report 
problems.   
Responses were received from 254 local authority counting officers giving a very high 66 per cent 
response rate.8 Scottish Unitary councils, London Boroughs and the South West region were slightly 
over-represented with response rates of 71, 72 and 76 per cent respectively, while the West Midlands 
and South East regions were slightly below average in responses at 57 and 58 per cent each. 
Nonetheless, this remains an excellent response rate for an electronic survey. All figures in tables are 
rounded and consequently may not sum to 100. An extensive range of qualitative replies to open 
questions were provided in addition to the quantitative replies.  These provide a rich source of 
additional information about the problems faced by COs, mostly explaining the nature of problems 
experienced in more detail.   
To add depth, 25 semi-structured interviews were conducted with key actors (1 with the CCO & DCCO, 
with all 11 RCOs and the Chief Electoral Officer for Northern Ireland (CEONI), and with a further 12 
COs from across Britain) conducted mostly by telephone.9 The interviews allowed electoral officials at 
all levels, from the local upwards, to highlight important challenges not anticipated by the survey.  
Overall, this provides the most comprehensive information about the quality of electoral 
administration and management at any single UK electoral event and provides a unique academic 
picture of the how it performed on the ground under considerable pressure.  Additional data on the 
leave/remain vote was added was sourced from the Electoral Commission.10  Socio-demographic 
information comes from the 2011 Census11 and the ONS Migration Indicators Tool.12 
Results 
Management structure  
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The Electoral Commission is often criticised (Clark, 2017a; Pickles, 2016), including by local electoral 
administrators over its previous conduct of referendums (James, 2017). Nonetheless, the survey 
revealed high levels of overall satisfaction among local COs with the 2016 management structure. 82 
per cent agreed or strongly agreed that it ‘worked well’ (Table 1). Interviews with RCOs also suggested 
that the system seemed to have been successfully adapted from the model used in 2011.  They 
thought that the Chief Counting Officer (CCO) had made many efforts to reach out and speak to COs 
at local and regional levels.  RCOs described themselves as being well-supported, drawing most of 
their support from their local teams.  Many officials were keen to stress that informal local networks 
and relationships were more important than the formal structures in providing support, however. 
Informal regional support and peer advice networks often exist for elections (Clark, 2015).  
RCOs explained that the management structure allowed them to provide advice, support and a 
problem-solving system to local COs.  It allowed them to identify ‘at risk’ COs to ensure compliance 
and consistency in the delivery of the referendum.13  However, the centralised management structure 
was not thought to be an improvement on the system used for elections.  Respondents stressed the 
differences between the referendum and elections, most notably the complexity of the ballot 
structure in normal elections where many different candidates stand.  
 
Table 1: Views on Referendum Management Structure (%) 
 Strongly 
disagree 







- 3 15 74 7 248 
Management 
structure worked 
better than for an 
election 
3 27 60 9 1 248 
CCO’s planning for 
the referendum 
was effective 
1 5 20 66 9 248 
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RCO’s planning for 
the referendum 
was effective 
- 3 12 66 20 248 
 
The negative effects of the use of directions included increased financial costs (43 per cent either 
agreed or strongly agreed), absorbing staff time (39 per cent either agreed or strongly agreed) and 
overriding local experience (24 per cent either agreed or strongly agreed).  Qualitative interviews 
suggested that some local COs felt that the Electoral Commission was overly directive and that the 
directions were ‘self-evident and just good practice’.  The directions were therefore not accepted 
uncritically and did not add value in every circumstance, but had some positive effects.    
 
Legislative framework 
A key stage in organising an election is establishing a clear legislative framework. The government 
committed to hold the referendum before December 2017 but there was long-running uncertainty 
about the date of polling day. There was concern within the electoral community that it could be called 
at short notice with relatively short preparation time, or shortly after another set of elections, to the 
devolved institutions and local government. The worry was that this would amplify pressures on small 
local electoral services teams. The government laid The European Union Referendum Regulations 
2016 before Parliament on 23rd February 2016, setting the date of the referendum as 23 June 2016.  
As Table 2 shows, most respondents were generally satisifed that the legislative framework was set 
out sufficiently in advance and that it set out the duties of electoral officials clearly.  The Electoral 
Commission published a timetable containing the statutory deadlines for the referendum.14 There 
were some concerns about this timetable, with 28 per cent of respondents agreeing or strongly 
agreeing that it was too tight.   
The government was forced to introduce further late legislation extending the electoral registration 
deadline from 7th June by 48 hours to midnight on the 9th June. This followed a high-profile crash of 
the voter registration website.15 The extension had a major effect on many electoral officials. Local 
authorities were unable to employ and train additional staff at such short notice. This meant that 
many local authority electoral administrators worked longer hours, adding to stress levels. Some 
respondents reported significant degrees of exhaustion since the referendum had closely followed 




‘There was just no let up in the work load and it just got progressively more and more. It's no 
wonder so many people went off with stress related issues’. 
The extention of the deadline also reduced the time available to prepare for polling day.  This 
increased the chances of errors and in some cases led to compromises being made such as there being 
insufficient time to send polling cards to the late registrants: 
‘Not all late applicants received poll cards despite them being sent 1st class on Monday 20th 
June as it was simply too close to the date of the poll. We were unable to carry out all the checks 
we would normally carry out on polling station registers to ensure that they were both complete 
and accurate…  due to a software issue caused by the deadline extension. This added a significant 
risk to the process that could have been mitigated by not altering the determination deadline 
for the Referendum.’ 
Table 2 shows that 44 per cent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the extention affected 
their ability to deliver the referendum.   Although the outcome of the referendum was clear cut, these 
compromises could have had a profound effect on the delivery of the referendum and potentially, 
therefore, the legitimacy of the outcome in a closer and contested referendum result.  

















The statutory timetable for the 
referendum was too tight 
4 35 32 23 5 
 
248 
The overall timing of the 
referendum did not cause any 
significant difficulties 
26 44 12 17 1 
 
248 
The legislative framework for the 
referendum was set in sufficient 
time ahead of the poll 
4 24 19 51 2 
 
248 
The legislative framework clearly 
set out my responsibilities  
- 3 15 78 5 
 
248 
The extension of the registration 
deadline caused challenges 





disproportionate to the number of 
electors registered as a result 
The extension of the registration 
deadline had a significant impact 
on our ability to deliver the 
referendum 





Major concerns were raised about the system that funds electoral administration (Table 3).  
Alarmingly, 47 per cent disagreed or strongly disagreed that they had funding available to support the 
work required to compile the electoral register. Interviews with RCOs also suggested that while many 
areas were sufficiently funded others faced serious problems.  As one observed:  
‘We had some serious concerns about whether all COs in the [region] had enough resources.  In 
some councils it felt like a shoe string operation.’   
Cuts within local authority budgets appear to be one cause of the problem.  As one respondent put it:  
‘Local Authority budgets are severely squeezed and while historically authorities have "subsidized" 
elections, this is becoming more difficult or impossible.’   
Another explanation was the introduction of a new individual electoral registration (IER) system, 
which was commonly described as more expensive to implement (James, 2020). One CO described 
how the ‘funding massively underestimates the scale of the task at in hand in IER.’  Cuts in central 
government Cabinet Office funding for election administration were also cited. 









There is an efficient 
process for distributing 
referendum funds to 
administrators 
- 8 26 61 3 248 
Sufficient funds were 
provided through the 
5 15 38 40 3 248 
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fees and charges 
process to run the 
referendum 
There is sufficient 
funding available to 
support the work 
required to compile the 
electoral register 
16  29 23 1 248 
 
A further source of resource pressures was the rise in applications for postal and proxy votes. Over 
half of respondents highlighted extensive challenges in this.  One local authority spoke of an ‘over 30 
per cent increase in postal [vote applications] between May and June… [and an] …over 150 per cent 
increase in proxies’.  This quote was typical: 
‘The sheer volume and timing of postal and proxy vote applications was a big challenge for the 
electoral services team (time consuming to process) especially in the week before the poll.’  
Qualitative comments suggested the existing arrangements whereby the costs of the poll were 
covered by central government were insufficient.  Electoral registration had become a seasonal event 
with people registering and requesting a postal vote close to the deadline.  The strain of the electoral 
event was therefore put on local authority electoral registration teams, not central government. 
There was evidence that funding levels affected the running of elections and voter registration.  Table 
4 below demonstrates the associations between responses to whether sufficient funding was 
provided and various work that COs undertook.  The negative correlations in the first three lines show 
some statistically significant effects on voter registration problems.  Insufficient funding for electoral 
registration reduced the ability of officials to deal with duplicate registrations and address confusion 
amongst the public about their registration status.  
The availability of funds for the poll also affected respondents’ overall sense of satisfaction with the 
management process.  Printing and the despatch of postal votes were also related to electoral 
registration funding.  There is therefore an understandable logic linking these and some evidence in 
support of hypothesis 3.  Effects were not always found on the polling process, however. 
Table 4: Correlations between funding and polling/registration problems 
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 Sufficient funds were provided 
through the fees and charges 
process to run the referendum 
There is sufficient funding 
available to support the work 
required to compile the 
electoral register 
Levels of duplicate applications 
for registration 
n/a -.263** 
Confusion from the public 
about their registration status 
n/a -.187** 
Requirement to provide date 
of birth and National Insurance 
Number 
n/a -.150* 
The overall management 
structure for the referendum 
worked well 
.181** n/a 
Postal vote dispatch timings 
(domestic) 
 -.016 -.138* 
Postal vote dispatch timings 
(overseas) 
.036  -.078 
Printing -.072  -.132* 
Polling Station Recruitment -.092  -.139* 
Polling Stations not opening on 
time 
.031 n/a 





**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
  
No statistically significant relationship was found between a council’s political composition and 
resourcing.  Geographical effects were evident. London boroughs were more likely to report 
insufficient funds to conduct the poll (β = .190, p< 0.01), while having insufficiently experienced staff 
was less likely to be a problem in Scotland (β = .145, p< 0.05).   
Electoral Fraud  
Table 5 shows that there were very few suspected cases of electoral fraud with only 11 per cent of 
COs reporting a problem.16  However, slightly contradictorily, a higher proportion pointed to suspected 
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cases of personation and postal vote fraud. Nonetheless, these numbers are still miniscule when 
placed alongside an electorate of 46 million potential voters.  The few suspected cases are in contrast 
to the problems posed by campaigners on the day. The hashtag #pengate was widely circulated on 
social media encouraging voters to take pens to the polling station rather than pencils because their 
votes could be rubbed out and changed by electoral officials.  Some COs suggested that this created 
difficulties in polling stations and telephone calls to helplines. Pens were thrown at polling staff in one 
instance.  Some voters ‘insist[ed] that the Council would rub out their marks on the ballot paper when 
we emptied the ballot boxes at the count’.  They might then take photographs in the polling stations, 
something which is forbidden in Britain, out of mistrust. As one report noted:  
‘Only had one incident of an elector taking a photo of their ballot paper. They were challenged by 
the Presiding Officer and reacted very aggressively and verbally abused the Presiding Officer.’  
Some Leave campaigners were suspicious of officials in other ways: 
‘We had some issues with agents from vote leave who did not nominate postal vote agents until 
after we had begun opening postal votes… they then verbally accused the team of potential 
fraudulent activity…. Although the Vote Leave agent did apologise for this slur, at times this 
campaign group were aggressive.’ 
 
Table 5: Problems with electoral fraud 











of electoral fraud 
 89 10 - 1 - - 248 
Suspected cases 
of personation 
 77 17 3 3 1 - 248 












at the count  





 68 25 4 3 - - 248 
 
Concerns have been raised about postal vote fraud in Britain (and elsewhere).  However, there was 
little evidence of postal vote fraud in the referendum. Indeed, there were only 291 alleged cases of 
electoral fraud reported by police forces in 2016, across all electoral events including the referendum 
(Electoral Commission, 2017). The extent to which problems were reported, it seems as if error may 
have been the cause.  In one case a referendum agent reported a number of routine signature 
mismatches to the Police as fraudulent – but the electoral official suspected that this was just due to 
a misunderstanding of the adjudication process.   
Table 5 suggests that the most widespread problem was inappropriate behaviour or intimidation at 
polling stations by campaigners, with a third of local COs suggesting that there was a challenge of 
some degree.  Qualitative comments described how this could include displaying campaign posters, 
or handing out leaflets close to polling stations.  One CO said that they had ‘several instances of tellers 
having to be moved on due to their intimidation of the electorate.’  In another counting area: 
We had one incident where a supporter of the exit campaign parked a car and the individual used 
a speaker to hail abuse at voters entering one polling station at [Location given]. Due to the 
attitude of the individual campaigning for exit, polling staff were advised to ring the police but the 
incident passed before the Police arrived. 
Qualitative comments also recorded that some campaigners were not following procedures at the 
count.  When the affiliation of the agents involved in problems was cited by COs in the qualitative 
comments, they were all identified as Leave campaigners.   
What can be said about the drivers of electoral fraud?  Taking electoral fraud as the dependent 
variable, no correlations were found with the levels of immigration or the size of the Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi communities.  Instead, the patterns of voter fraud were correlated with voting intentions 
in bivariate analysis. The higher the leave vote was associated with fewer suspicions of electoral fraud 
(β = -.167, p < 0.05) fewer suspicions of impersonation (β = -.217, p < 0.01) but more inappropriate 
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campaigning in polling stations (β =.151, p < 0.05).  This suggests that political dynamics were most 
important.   
There was also qualitative evidence that voter intimidation from campaigners had clear political 
dynamics.  It is important to note that many problems with intimidation may have been due to 
differences in perception between what some campaigners, voters and administrators saw as 
legitimate campaign efforts. Electoral officials widely suggested that inappropriate campaigning were 
not for the most part attempts to deliberately rig the referendum.  Rather, the actions were often 
from ‘new [campaigners] and were not familiar with the 'do's and don'ts'.’   Some RCOs and COs had 
to deal with counting agents who were inexperienced and unfamiliar with the counting process 
because they had not been involved in elections before.  This led to some uncertainty and to some 
practical confusion as to who the electoral officials should liaise with on the night.  All reported 
examples were with Leave campaigners. 
Bureaucratic Hurdles to Participation 
There was much more evidence of problems with bureaucratic hurdles impeding participation at the 
referendum.  As Table 6 shows, local electoral officials commonly reported widespread confusion 
amongst the public about their registration status.  Only two per cent of COs said that they 
experienced no problems and nearly half of COs rated this problem as extensive.  As one suggested: 
We had a number of people who were not registered and who thought that paying Council Tax 
meant that they were registered… considering the amount of voters, it was unnerving to see 
how many people did not know the process. 
 
Table 6: Bureaucratic Hurdles to Participation 












 2 - 7 16 31 45 248 
Levels of 
duplicate 





People asking to 
vote who were 
not on register 
 3 32 31 21 11 2 254 
Requirement to 
provide DoB & NI 
number 
 10 21 27 23 15 4 248 
 
This directly affected the polling process with a low level, but common, problem of citizens turning up 
but not being allowed to vote because they were not on the register.  Only 3 per cent of respondents 
reported no problems with this. Similar results were reported by local poll workers at the 2015 general 
election, suggesting that this is a regular problem in UK elections (Clark and James, 2017).  Qualitative 
interviews with RCOs suggested that overall numbers were relatively low.  Nonetheless, comments 
from COs suggested that the numbers could be high in places, and there was evidence that some of 
these were citizens that had been removed from the electoral register in December 2015 as a result 
of the introduction of IER.   
There was no evidence that any of these problems were more likely to occur in urban or student areas, 
however.  Using data from the 2011 Census about the population density or student population, 
neither correlated with the problems identified in Table 6.  There therefore was not much support for 
hypothesis 2.  Geography did matter, however.  Using a comparison of means, problems were less 
frequent in Scottish unitary authorities.   Another driver of these problems also seemed to be the Vote 
Leave/Remain vote share.  An analysis of Pearson correlations revealed bivariate relationships 
between the Leave share and confusion amongst the public (β = .214, p < 0.01) duplicate registrations 
(β =.229, p < 0.01) and people asking to vote who were not on the register (β =.184, p < 0.01).   
 
Table 7 reports four logit ordinal regression models.  The dependent variables are four separate 
registration problems, each measured on a 1-6 Likert scale with lower scores indicating no problems, 
high scores indicating a high level of problems.  The independent variables are a range of socio-
economic, institutional and electoral data that have been correlated with electoral administrative 
performance elsewhere (Clark, 2017b, 2019). The models suggest that many of these bivariate effects 
disappear in multivariate analysis, even when significance levels are relaxed to the .10 level.  Model 
fit is also very low.  The one small remaining effect, however, is that confusion about registration 
status was less of a problem in Scotland. What makes Scotland unique is that it has different 
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institutional arrangements: Valuation Joint Boards (VJBs) co-ordinate electoral registration, while a 
Scottish Electoral Management Board has been proactive at creating a community of shared practices 
for elections, following problems in 2007.  This suggests that institutional arrangements and networks 
amongst practitioners may have a small positive influence on the electoral process, a finding echoed 
in other parts of this article. 
 












Student population .063 (.052) -.031 (.050) -.073 (.053) -.027 (.050) 
Immigration .028 (0.14) .013 (.013) -.001 (.013) -.006 (.013) 
Voted Leave .035 (0.17) .005 (.016) .026 (.017) .005 (.016) 
Population Density -.015 (.011) -.014 (.011)  -.010 (.011) .005 (.010) 
Local Authority type     
- Scottish Unitary = 0 1.499 (.593) .750 (.498) 1.052 (.537)** .294 (.562) 
- Metropolitan = 0 -.606 (4.66) -.410 (.359) .255 (.457) .440 (.441) 
- London = 0 -.600 (.813) .087 (.778) -.362 (.802) -.269 (.760) 
- English Unitary = 0 -.118 (.360) -.876 (.355) -.206 (.371) -.515 (.348) 
- Welsh Unitary = 0  .503 (.600) -.549 (.599) -.089 (.628) -.818 (.594) 
N 226 236 230 227 
Nagelkerke R2 .134 .081 .069 .034 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. * Significant at the 0.10 level. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Conclusions 
A key but often unappreciated and unexamined, task for local government officials in many countries 
is to run elections.  This article has documented the nature of the challenges posed by the UK Brexit 
referendum as a way of examining the pressures and consequences on local government to deliver 
elections in an established democracy. The views of such election administrators are crucial as they 
arguably perform a key role as the ‘street-level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky, 1980) of the electoral process. 
The UK is a case study of a decentralised of electoral management for elections, but a hybrid model 
for referendums in which the Electoral Commission is given some powers of direction.  In this respect, 
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the case is relatively unique, and it is important to note for comparative purposes that the 
management structure used for the referendum was largely effective and an improvement on earlier 
referendums.  There were wider problems with late legislation passed, a lack of available funding, and 
problems such as levels of duplicate registrations that are likely to be challenges in all states holding 
elections. 
There was no evidence that problems with electoral fraud were associated with immigration, 
Bangladeshi or Pakistani communities, despite recent suggestions in Britain.  Instead, any suspicions 
were structured by voting patterns.  The behaviour of Leave campaigners, particularly at polling 
stations, was cited as a cause for concern.  Bureaucratic hurdles to participation were commonly found 
in the referendum – especially problems with voters wanting to register, but not appearing on the 
electoral roll.  Multi-variate analysis suggested these problems were less frequent in Scotland, 
suggesting that regional organisational arrangements were more conducive to electoral integrity.  The 
strongest bivariate relationship identified, however, was the effect of funding deficiencies on the 
compilation of the electoral register. 
There are therefore some important lessons for the theory and practice of electoral integrity where it 
faces the voter, at local level.  During an age of austerity, local electoral services departments, like 
many other local government services, are under financial pressure and this can impact negatively 
upon election quality.  The rise of new populist movements, who are naturally more critical of public 
officials, may pose further challenges to the administration of elections.  Lastly, organisational factors 
and informal networks are important in countering these challenges. These all need further research 
at the local level, in different types of electoral contest, and in different countries, to understand more 
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1 The devolution of electoral law for Scottish elections, and the unique history of Northern Ireland have led to 
slightly different arrangements there.   
2 Van Ham (2014) identifies 23 different conceptualisations of well-run elections. These include frameworks 
proposed by Elklit and Reynolds, 2005 and Norris et al., 2013.  However, most tend to be broader than just 
electoral administration and management. 
3 The outcome of these initial pilots was contested, with the government claiming success and opponents 
claiming many had been deterred from voting. 




responsibilities.pdf, p. 8 
6 Para 7(5) Schedule 3 European Union Referendum Act 2015  
7 https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/209419/Briefing-European-Union-
Referendum-Management-2016-06-14.pdf Gibraltar was a separate electoral area and overseen by the South 
West RCO. The Chief Electoral Officer for Northern Ireland (CEONI) was the CO for the whole of Northern Ireland. 
8 Nine hard copy responses were received and added to the dataset manually. These are included in the overall 
response rates.   
9 Two interviews were conducted face to face: a joint interview with the CCO and DCCO; and another with one 
RCO.   
1010 https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-referendums/past-
elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum/electorate-and-count-information, date accessed 28th October 
2017. 
11 Student population (Table KS501UK) for ‘Schoolchildren and full-time student: Age 18 and over 
(Percentage)’; population density (Table QS102EW); Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities were taken from 
Table KS201UK.  
12 Migrant population levels for local authorities for 2016 taken from ONS Migration Indicators Tool, published 
on 24 August 2017,  ‘Migrant NINo registrations per thousand resident population aged 16 to 64’, 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/migrationwithintheuk/dat
asets/localareamigrationindicatorsunitedkingdom.   
13 The Electoral Commission routinely published and updated a risk register throughout the EU referendum 
process summarising these issues and helping to identify any potential difficulties.   
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15 Commonly explained as caused by weight of applications. For other suggestions, see Public Administration & 
Constitutional Affairs Select Committee (2017).   
16 For data on suspected electoral fraud cases see: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-
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